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THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA:




THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court of Canada is a court of common law and
equity, and a general court of appeal for Canada.' It is a court of
mixed jurisdiction, that is to say, it has both original and appellate
jurisdiction.2 Over a period of some ninety years since its founding,
the Court has adjudicated a great variety of matters, involving both
private law and public matters, from every part of Canada. An amend-
ment to the Supreme Court Act in 19493 abolished all appeals to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England, and the Supreme
Court became finally, the court of last resort for all matters. The
Court's decision terminating a controversy is thus the last word and no
one, save Parliament, can overrule it. This tribunal, what it is, and
what it does, are matters which should therefore be regarded as being
of vital importance to Canadians.
1. Origin and development.
Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States or the High Court
of Australia, both of which exist because the written constitutions
of those countries specifically make provision for them, the Supreme
Court of Canada owes its existence to a statute.4 Parliament, acting
under the permissive authority vested in it by section 101 of the
Britisk North America Act,5 enacted, in 1875, legislation to establish
a Supreme Court and a Court of Exchequer for the Dominion of
Canada.6
*Mr. Cavarzan was awarded the degree of Master of Laws by Osgoode
Hall Law School in 1965.
1 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 259, s. 3.
2 Objection was raised to the granting of any original jurisdiction to the
Court: Debates, House of Commons, Session 1875, Mr. Palmer at p. 737;
original jurisdiction for the Court was justified by the power of the federal
government to appoint judges, B.N.A. Act, s. 96.
3 1949 (Can. 2nd Sess.) c. 37, s. 3.
4 Canada: 1875 (Can.) c. 11; United States: U.S. Const. art III, s. 1, "The
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court...";
Australia: Austl. Const. c. III, s. 71, "The judicial power of the Commonwealth
shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of
Australia...."
5 Parlaiment is thereby empowered to "provide for the Constitution, Main-
tenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada....
B.N.A. Act, 1867, c. 3, s. 101.
6 1875 (Can.) c. 11.
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During the confederation debates in 1865 it was observed that:
There are many arguments for and against the establishment of such a
court. But it was thought wise and expedient to put into the Constitution
a power to the General Legislature, that if after full consideration they
think it advisable to establish a General Court of Appeal from all the
Superior Courts of all the provinces, they may do so.7
Ten years later, the country's representatives in Parliament were
still divided on the issue of the necessity for such a tribunal. Many
feared that the right to appeal to the Crown in England would be lost.
Indeed, it was the intent of those who favoured the creation of the
Court, to make it supreme,s but the Act which became law preserved
the right of appeal to England.9 One alarmed member observed the
plight of the "unfortunate" Americans:
In the United States they had established a Supreme Court, and they had
established one from great necessity, because they foolishly committed
national suicide by their severance from Great Britain.'0
Another, regarding the establishment of the Court as a needless
expenditure, would have traded the Court for a stretch of the Pacific
Railroad or for deeper canals.'1 More substantial and enduring objec-
tions came from Quebec members who feared that the Civil Law
would not fare well in a court where the majority of the judges had no
training in the Civil Law.12 The Court's supporters prevailed, however,
and on the 8th of April, 1875, the Act establishing the Court was
passed. A declaration on the 11th of January, 1876, brought into oper-
ation the judicial functions of the Court. The proponents of the bill
regarded it as "a good law which had for its sole object the harmoni-
ous working of our young constitution".13
One of the very first cases heard by the Court, Brassard v. Lange-
vin,14 raised "grave questions of constitutional law, in which all in this
Dominion are deeply interested".15 Indeed, the case would undoubtedly
7 Waite, The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada 1865
quotes from an address given at Quebec City on February 6, 1865 by Hon. John
A. Macdonald.
8 MacKinnon, The Establishment of the Supreme Court of Canada, (1946)
27 Can. Hist. Rev. 258.
9 Supra, footnote 6, s. 47.
10 Debates, House of Commons, Session 1875, Mr. Wilkes, at p. 752.
11 Id., Mr. White, at p. 908.
12 Id., Mr. Langlois, at p. 932.
13 Id., Hon. Mr. Fournier, at p. 288, in a speech introducing the bill to the
House for first reading.
14 [1876-77] S.C.R. 145. It was held in this case that the election of a
member for the House of Commons, guilty of clerical undue influence by his
agents, was void. The Catholic Church and the various parish priests in a
Quebec riding had sided with a particular candidate, the parishioners being
told that to vote otherwise would be a sin. The new Court was faced with
grave issues of freedom of speech and the position of the clergy under the
law. The French Catholic members of the bench faced a particularly difficult
conflict as reflected by the opening remarks of the judgment of Taschereau
J., at p. 188: "I acknowledge that it is with great misgivings as to my own
powers, and with a deep feeling of regret that I find myself compelled to
pronounce a decision as a Judge in a contestation of the nature of the present."
The unanimous Court voided the election of the respondent.
'5 Id., per Ritchie, J. at p. 215.
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be classified today as a "civil liberties" matter. Inevitably such deci-
sions engendered controversy and since the Court lacked a solid con-
stitutional foundation, attempts were made to legislate it out of
existence.'
6
But the Court survived initial controversy and has grown and
developed. The Act of 1875 is a slender statute and is devoted partly
to provisions for a Court of Exchequer. The Act was amended fre-
quently, apparently as the result of experience gained in the day-to-day
workings of the Court, altering thereby the bare framework of the
original Act and adding to its scope. 7 A separate Exchequer Court
statute was passed in 1887.18
Initially the Court was a six-judge tribunal,' 9 but it was expanded
to seven in 192720 and finally to nine in 1949.21 Also, from the begin-
ning, five judges constituted a quorum22 for the hearing of cases and
this is still the rule,23 although it later became possible to have four-
judge courts.24 The rules respecting quorums on the hearing of applica-
tions for leave to appeal now provide for a five-judge court on applica-
tions in criminal capital cases, and a three-judge court on applications
in all other cases.25 Certain matters, such as an application for leave
to intervene, may be dealt with by a single judge.26
The Court's original judisdiction in constitutional reference cases
and matters of habeas corpus has existed from the beginning.27 The
greater part of the Court's jurisdiction is, however, its appellate juris-
diction. The early provisions respecting appeals from the provincial
courts were such that these courts had a broader power than the
Court itself, to determine which cases would go to the Court on
appeal.28 Often the Court could be by-passed entirely by the taking of
appeals directly to the Privy Council.
The significant change respecting the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion came first in criminal appeals. Following a short-lived early
attempt to cut off criminal appeals to the Privy Council, valid legisla-
tion was passed in 1933 making the Supreme Court the court of last
16 Supra, footnote 8.
17 Appendix A.
18 Exchequer Court Act, 1887 (Can.) c. 16.
:19 Supra, footnote 9, s. 3.
20 1927 (Can.) c. 33, s. 1.
21 Supra, footnote 3, s. 1.
22 Supra, footnote 19, s. 12.
23 R.S.C., 1952, c. 259, s. 25.
24 Supreme Court Act amended by 1889 (Can.) c. 37, s. 1 provided for a
four-judge court if the fifth judge had taken part in earlier proceedings in the
case; 1896 (Can.) c. 14, s. 2. provided for the first time for a four-judge court
on consent of all parties; R.S.C., 1952, ss. 28(2) and 29 are the current provi-
sions embodying these amendments.25 1956 (Can.) c. 48, s. 6; Laskin, Comment, The Coffin Case and Amend-
ments to Appellate Jurisdiction, (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 966.26 Supreme Court of Canada Rules, Rule 60.
27 Supra, footnote 22, ss. 51-53.
28 See Laskin, The Bupreme Court of Canada, (1951) 29 Can. Bar. Rev.
1038.
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resort for all criminal matters.29 The year 1949 brought an end to
appeals to the Privy Council in civil cases.30
The Act of 1875 imposed a two thousand dollar monetary restric-
tion on civil actions appealable to the Court without leave from Quebec
Courts only.3 1 By 1920, the amount or value of the matter in contro-
versy in the appeal was required to exceed two thousand dollars
in order that an appeal be taken to the Court without leave from
all jurisdictions in Canada.32 In 1956 this amount was increased to
the present minimum of ten thousand dollars. 33 Although this mone-
tary limit has, no doubt, reduced the number of petty appeals, the
amount in controversy cannot always guarantee that the appeal in-
volves an important legal issue.
It is the issues arising, not the amount of money or form of procedure,
that renders a case of sufficient moment to be determined by the highest
tribunal.34 . .. To make the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court depend on
financial questions alone is unsound. Many of the most vital issues of civil
liberty and human relations arise from cases of small or no monetary
value.35
In addition to the Court's jurisdiction under the Supreme Court
Act and the Criminal Code, certain federal statutes specifically confer
a right of appeal.3 6 The jurisdiction of the Court will be examined
more fully later.
2. What it does.
It has already been indicated that the Court hears and disposes
of cases involving a great variety of issues. In civil cases where the
amount in controversy in the appeal does not exceed ten thousand
dollars, an appeal can be taken only by leave. If leave is sought from
the provincial court, it will be granted only if the question involved
in the appeal is considered to be one that ought to be submitted to the
to the Supreme Court for decision.3 7 If the provincial court refuses
to grant leave, and even if no leave is sought from the provincial
court, application for leave may be made to the Court itself.38 Criminal
29 Livingston, Abolition of Appeals from Canadian Courts to the Privy
Council, (1950-51) 64 Harv. Law Rev. 104, traces the steps by which appeal
to the Privy Council in all cases was abolished.
30 Supra, footnote 3, s. 3.
31 1875 (Can.) c. 11, s. 17.
32 1920 (Can.) c. 32, s. 2.
33 1956 (Can.) c. 48, s. 2.
34 How, The Too Limited Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada,
(1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 573, at p. 575.
35 Id., pp. 582-3.
36 The Canadian Bar Association Papers, (1959), contains an outline of
statutory provisions in R.S.C. 1952, giving the right to appeal to the Court:
Admiralty Act, c. 1, ss. 32(1) (2), 33; Aeronautics Act, c. 2, s. 19- Bankruptcy
Act, c. 14, ss. 140, 1514; Canadian National-Canadian Pacific Act, c. 39, ss.
26, 27; Canadian National Railways Act, c. 29, s. 44; Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act, c. 54, ss. 12-14; Dominion Controverted Elections Act, c. 87,
ss. 63-68; Exchequer Court Act, c. 98, ss. 23, 30, 82-86; Excise Tax Act, c. 100,
s. 58; National Defence Act, c. 184, s. 196; Northwest Territories Act, c. 331,
s. 28; and the Railway Act, c. 234, s. 53.
37 Supra, footnote 23, s. 38.
38 Id., s. 41(1).
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appeals may be taken to the Court in summary conviction offences
only after the Court has granted leave.39 An accused person who is con-
victed and is sentenced to death and whose conviction has been
affirmed by the provincial court of appeal, has an appeal as of right
to the Court.40 The Governor in Council may refer certain important
questions of law or fact to the Court for its opinion.41 These reference
cases usually involve basic constitutional issues. The Court or any
two of the judges thereof may be called upon by the Senate or the
House of Commons to examine and report upon any private bill or
petition.4
2
In short, the foregoing provisions and others, 4 3 indicate that
the Court was created to deal with cases involving important issues
and calling for examination, deliberation and final adjudication by
the most august judicial body in the country. The answer to the ques-
tion, "What does the Court do?" is, it is submitted, that it decides
the most important legal controversies in Canada.
3. The relative importance of controversies
What then of cases involving issues of civil liberty? It is submitted
that such cases are among the most important, if not the most impor-
tant, type of controversy which can arise for adjudication. But the
situation in Canada in this area of the law is unclear. If it can be
determined with some certainty which civil liberties exist in Canada,44
it is more diffcult to state definitely which level of government has
the power to legislate to grant or deny any or all civil liberties.45 This
much is clear; the issues in civil liberties controversies are of such
moment that they should receive the attention of the Court. If any
such issue is barred access to the Court, it must not be for any for-
malistic reason. When this is clearly recognized, it will be seen that
it is important that procedures for getting before the Court be more
clearly defined and that conditions precedent to acquiring a right to
a hearing in these cases be kept to a minimum or eliminated. There is
danger, of course, that removal of such conditions precedent may result
in a flood of litigation initially. The result may not be unlike that in
the United States where,
The solicitude of the Supreme Court for civil liberties has resulted in a
striking increase in the number of cases involving them which have
been heard by that tribunal.46
The question then would be whether such a result is bad. This can
hardly be a bad result if there are many bona fide civil liberties issues
39 Id., s. 41(3).
40 1960-61 (Can.) c. 44, s. 11, enacting s. 597A Cr. Code.
41 Supra, footnote 39, s. 55.
42 Id., s. 56.
43 R.S.C., 1952, c. 259, s. 57 (habeas corpus), s. 61 (certiorari), and s. 62
(removal of cases from provincial courts).
44 Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada, Preface.
45 Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (2nd ed.), p. 942.
46 Schwartz, The Changing Role of the United States Supreme Court,
(1950), 28 Can. Bar Rev. 48, at p. 60.
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which would be litigated but for the procedural hurdles and, perhaps
more important, the inhospitable attitude of the Court. Courts have
always been adept at weeding out unworthy causes and if such causes
were to threaten to overwork the Court, it is probable that the threat
would be, at worst, temporary.
A. The Court's image: a civil liberties tribunal.
There is only token recognition of civil liberties as an independent
value in Canada's Constitution, the Britisk Nortk America Act. Protec-
tion is given to denominational schools by section 93. The term
"civil rights" is used in sections 92(13) and 97, but this expression
is generally considered to relate to property rights in the provinces.47
By way of contrast, the Constitution of the United States contains
a Bill of Rights to which all laws and legal processes are subject.48
Theoretically, the Canadian Constitution divides all possible legislative
power between the federal government on the one hand and the
various provincial governments on the other. But none of the enume-
rated powers in sections 91 and 92 grants the power to legislate in
relation to civil liberties as such. It has been reasoned, applying the
known rules of Canadian constitutional interpretation, that what is not
expressly given to the provinces to legislate by section 92 falls to the
federal government by virtue of the residuary power of the "peace,
order, and good government" clause in section 91. Professor Laskin
defines the issue in this manner:
• . . the main question for determination is whether invasion of civil
liberties is prohibited to the Dominion or to the provinces, and, correspon-
dingly, whether responsibility for their protection is in the Dominionor in the provinces.
This question, like any other question of the scope of legislative power
or the constitutionality of legislation, falls for decision to the courts,
and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court of Canada.49
Thus, in some leading civil liberties cases such as S.M.T. (Eastern)
Ltd. v. Winner50 and Saumur v. Quebec and A.G. Quebec,5 ' the Court
has come down in favour of the federal power, and declared unconstitu-
tional the provincial legislation.
Professor Laskin concludes that:
. . . the absence of affirmative Dominion legislation should not militate
against making it perfectly clear that civil liberties lie beyond provincial
control.5 2
This is too simple an answer, for it depends upon the giving of a very
narrow meaning to the term "civil liberties" (as Professor Laskin
pointed out prior to his conclusion). The recent decision in Oil, Chemi-
47 Supra, footnote 44.
48 U.S. Const. Amendments 1-10.
49 Laskin, supra, footnote 45, at p. 457.
50 [19511 S.C.R. 887.
51 [1953] S.C.R. 299.
52 Supra, footnote 48, at p. 471. Cf., the "citizenship" doctrine of Rand J.




cal, and Atomic Workers' International Union v. Imperial Oil Ltd.,5 3
illustrates the complexity of this problem and underlines the impor-
tance of the Court's role in assigning civil liberties a provincial or
federal value. In that case, a union questioned the validity of provincial
legislation which had the effect of forbidding the use of union funds
to support any political party. The union viewed the issue as one of
free speech or political liberty (they saw the provincial legislation
as an attempt by the party in power to stifle support for any opposi-
tion). The Court, however, upheld the finding of the provincial
appeal court that the legislation was valid provincial legislation in the
field of labour relations.
Parliament and some legislatures have enacted civil liberties
legislation which is for the most part declaratory.54 What significant
law there is today in this field is to be found in the decisions of the
Court. Indeed, so long as the constitution remains unchanged, the
enforcement and development of civil liberties law in Canada is bound
to rest with the Court. In order to perform this increasingly important
function efficiently, appropriate procedures and techniques of adjudi-
cation are essential.
The comments of Professor Scott, regarding civil liberties in
Quebec, are apt in a discussion of the Court:
There seems little point in calling attention to the safeguards for civil
liberties inherent in the Civil Code if in fact the Quebec courts refuse to
apply them in concrete cases. The law at any given time is what the judges
say it is, not what is written down in the books.5 5
It is submitted, then, that the real impact of civil liberties law
in Canada is to be determined largely by the operation of, and the
attitudes of, the Supreme Court.
PART II
A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WORK OF THE
COURT FROM 1950 TO 1964
1. Source of Information
Just as an assessment of a person may be made by observing
such characteristics as appearance, speech and habits, so also may
an assessment be made of an institution. The Supreme Court of Canada
53 [1963] S.C.R. 584.
54 Parliament has enacted the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 (Can.) c. 44;
see also the Ontario Human Rights Code, 1961-62 (Ont.) c. 93; the Saskat-
chewan Bill of Rights Act, R.S.S. 1953, c. 345; legislation by certain provinces
aimed at specific grievances has been enacted, e.g., Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act, Stats. N.S., 1955, c. 5; same, Stats. N.B., 1956, c. 9.
55 Scott, The Bill of Rights and Quebec Law, (1959) 37 Can. Bar Rev.
135, at p. 140.
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has nmany observable characteristics, among them its "public image",
and the formal rules which govern its operations. More important,
however, in attempting an assessment of this Court, are the basic facts
of what it says and what it does.
A review was made of the Court's work covering an interval
roughly from the time of the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council
until the end of 1964. All available reported decisions in the Supreme
Court Reports from and including the volume [1950] S.C.R. to and
including all available parts of the volume [1964] S.C.R. as of Decem-
ber 31, 1964, were canvassed. The object was to observe and assess
the Court in its role as Canada's highest judicial tribunal.
2. A Statistical Study
Every lawyer and every scholar, who essays to appraise or to criticize
the administration of justice or some phase thereof, feels the need of
accurate and authoritative statistics both as the basis of criticism and
as the foundation of assured recommendations for improvement.56
The term "statistical" when used with reference to this review
of the Court's work, connotes simply the counting and sorting of
information according to a predetermined classification. Although
some attempt has been made later to draw general conclusions from
the results, this was done bearing in mind the shortcomings of statis-
tical studies in general and of this study in particular.
57
(a) The background (the statistical sample).
Ideally every decision of the Court in the interval studied should
be available in the law reports, but it appears that the number of
decisions reported represents only about one-half of the Court's case
load. In the fifteen year period from 1950 to 1964, there are some 1032
reported decisions or, to borrow the dichotomy of the Supreme Court
Reports, "judgments" and "motions". Some 415 unreported judgments
are listed in that same period and approximately 300 unreported
motions for the last seven years of that period are listed. Prior to 1957
no list was included in the law reports of the Court's motion work.
The motions granted and motions denied were listed from 1957 to
1960, inclusive, following which date only the motions denied are
reported.
56 Pound, What Use Can Be Made Of Judicial Statistics, (1933) 12 Ore.
L. Rev. 89 at p. 89. The Osgoode Hall Law School has announced its intention
to review annually the work of the Supreme Court and to compile statistics;
see, Supreme Court Review, (1963) 3 Osgoode Hall L. J. 163. See also, Jacoby,
Some Realism About Judicial Statistics, (1939) 25 Va. L. Rev. 528, at p. 530;
"A great many of the common beliefs as to the nature of law and litigation
and in particular as to the place occupied in society by the phenomenon of
legal proceedings may not survive the experiment of testing them by factual
studies." The value of statistics has been emphasized in Kilgour, The Work
of the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1954, (1955) 13 U. of T. Fac. L. Rev. 17.
57 Pound, supra, footnote 56, at p. 91: "Very little of importance can be
drawn from statistical tables in and of themselves. Much that lies outside
of the tables is required to give them point and application."
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The basis on which the editors of the official reports select deci-
sions to be reported is not known; however, a review of all available
material reveals what may be some of the criteria:
i) all reference cases are reported;
(ii) most criminal appeals are reported;
i) most cases on which the Court is divided in opinion are reported;
(iv) the great majority of the unreported judgements are in cases where
the appeal is dismissed;
v) the great majority of the unreported motions are in cases where
leave to appeal was refused (this is unfortunate because it obscures the
Court's attitude towards granting leave to appeal under section 41 of
the Supreme Court Act);
(vi) common sense dictates that if a selection must be made from the
cases because all will not or cannot be reported, those selected will involve
important questions of law or issues having application throughout
Canada.
The remaining sample is further adulterated because certain
cases arising from proceedings instituted prior to the abolition of
Privy Council appeals (and therefore technically eligible for considera-
tion by the Privy Council) could not, from lack of sufficient informa-
tion in the reports, be excluded. Appeals to the Privy Council petered
out quickly after 1950, although the last one was not disposed of
until 1959.58 The number of such appeals in any one year would prob-
ably not be statistically significant and this flaw in the statistical
sample is probably inconsequential.
How may the statistical sample be described? It comprises about
one-half of the number of cases heard by the Court in the fifteen
year period reviewed (not necessarily one-half of the Court's work),
which cases presented the most difficulty to the Court, or which were
of general interest throughout Canada because of the principles in
issue, or which involved important questions of law.
Where a complete sampling is not possible, the results of a
statistical study are valid only if the technique of random sampling is
used. Here, the source material for the study has been presented by
the authors of the reports according to some criteria, and to this
extent any results would be biased. This is the most telling criticism
which can be made of this study, but the defect is not fatal. So long
as one is aware of the short-comings, appropriate allowances can be
made in formulating conclusions.
(b) The method.
A series of questions were applied to each reported decision and
the answers recorded. When all the cases had been so processed, a
tabulation was made of the three most significant questions for present
purposes. The tabulated findings are as follows:
5S Wakefield Co. v. Oil City Petroleums, [1958] S.C.R. 361.
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Q. 1 Origin and Disposition of Case on the Merits
(i) Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction:
(ii) Supreme Court Reference Case:
(iii) Appeal from Federal Courts:
Decision Affirmed
Decision Reversed
(iva) Appeal from Provincial Court on leave
granted by Supreme Court:
Decision Affirmed
Decision Reversed
(ivb) Appeal from Provincial Court on leave
granted by Provincial Court:
Decision Affirmed
Decision Reversed
(ivc) Appeal as of right from Provincial Court:
Decision Affirmed
Decision Reversed
(ivd) Appeal in forma pauperis
Q. 2 Motions for Leave to Appeal Before Supreme Court
(i) From Federal Court:
(ii) From Provincial Court:




Q. 3 Subject Matter of Appeals-Private or Public Law.59
Appeal from: Cases
Newfoundland .......... 3
Prince Edward Island 4
Nova Scotia ...................... 15






British Columbia ............ 126
Federal Court .................. 178
Cases





Decisions Affirmed .................. 571
In P art ........................................ 37
Reversed ....................................... 393
59 Jowitt, The Dictionary of English Law, at p. 1064 defines the terms
"public law" and "private law": 'With reference to its subject-matter, law Is
either public or private. Public law is that part of the law which deals with
the State, either by itself or in its relations with individuals, and Is called
constitutional, when it regulates the relations between the various divisions of
the sovereign power; and administrative, when it regulates the business which
the state has to do; the most important branches of the latter class are the
criminal law and the law for the prevention of crimes; the law relating to
education, public health, the poor, etc.; ecclesiastical law; and the law of
judicial procedure (courts of law, evidence, etc.).
Private or civil law deals with those relations between individuals with
which the state is not directly concerned: as in the relations between husband











Tabulation of the results brings to light certain relationships.
Thus, the contrast in case load between the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion (1014 cases) and the Court's original jurisdiction (18 cases) is
brought into bold relief.
The total number of appeals as of right or de plano is 709 and
the total number taken with the leave of some court is 274. Appeals
with leave resulted in reversals by the Court in 47.8 per cent of the
cases, whereas de piano appeals resulted in reversals in only 40 per
cent of the cases. This 40 per cent figure would be even lower, it is
submitted, since it is probable that most of the unreported decisions
of the Court dismissing the appeal, are in cases of appeals taken as
of right.60
The group of cases comprising the appeals taken with leave is
divisible into appeals by leave of the Supreme Court (173) and
appeals by leave of a provincial court (101). When the Court itself
gave leave, it reversed the decision in 48 per cent of the cases as
contrasted with reversal in 45.5 per cent of the cases where the pro-
vincial court gave leave. It must be remembered, however, that the
former group includes the large number of criminal appeals heard
by the Court and that only the Supreme Court is competent to grant
leave to appeal in these matters.
There were 668 private law appeals against only 342 public law
appeals. Thus, only 34 per cent of the Court's appellate work (and
therefore of virtually all of the Court's work) was in the area of
public law. Almost one-half of the public law work in turn is made
up of criminal appeals. The Court's work in the field of constitutional
law in the period of fifteen years amounts to 30 cases or 2 cases
per year on the average (a more realistic figure is 50 cases, or,
slightly more than 3 per year).61
Public law cases (other than criminal) which were appealed by
leave of the Court were 18 in number and were reversed in 28 per
cent of the cases. Those which were appealed by leave of the provin-
cial courts numbered 26 and were reversed in 42.3 per cent of the
cases. With respect to these public law cases, we are dealing with
very small numbers and, statistically speaking, no significant conclu-
and wife, parent and child, and the various kinds of property, contracts, torts,
trusts, legacies, the rights recognized by the rules of admiralty law, etc. Even
here, however, the courts take cognizance, to a certain extent, of the indirect
effects of private conduct on the community in general; they accordingly
refuse to sanction contracts which are immoral, or in restraint of trade or
marriage, or are otherwise against public policy.
60 Some 328 of 415 unreported decisions (or 80%) are cases where the
appeal was dismissed. If 300 of the 415 are de plano appeals, then the 40%
figure would be estimated at 34%.
61 In many cases there was a constitutional law issue amongst others, and
for purposes of the questionnaire, a choice of classification had to be made.
Thus, it is probable that in the period reviewed, there are as many as 50
constitutional law cases, or slightly more than 3 per year on the average.
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sions can be drawn from such results (since a minor variation produces
a disproportionate effect in the conclusions based on those results).
(d) Conclusions.
While the work done by the Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction is qualitatively important, it would seem from the number
of cases, that the Court may fairly be described as essentially an appel-
late tribunal. This being the case, it is the area of the Court's appel-
late jurisdiction which requires review and evaluation.
In spending much time and energy reviewing and confirming
decisions of lower courts, the Court must be said to be performing
the role of a rubber stamp. Review and confirmation by the Court
of a decision is, of course, valuable, and in individual cases may be
no less jurisprudentially significant than reversal accompanied by an
authoritative statement of the law. But surely the value of the
service performed by the Court diminishes in direct proportion to
the number of occasions on which it feels obliged to agree with and
confirm the decision under appeal.
It has already been seen that 60 per cent (and probably more)
of the de piano appeals are dismissed by the Court. Decisions appealed
by leave of a court, on the other hand, are dismissed in 52 per cent
of the cases, an appreciably lower percentage. It must be conceded,
then, that the Court's time is more usefully occupied in considering
a decision that has first undergone the scrutiny of some court on
an application for leave to appeal. Also, the fact that there are
generally more affirmations than reversals would indicate that too
many cases which should not be taken up, are appealed to the
Court.62 No doubt this is largely due to the fact that many de piano
appeals are taken and the Court has virtually no say in the matter.
The same is substantially true in the case of the large number of
appeals taken with the leave of provincial courts. Such a result sug-
gests, it is submitted, that the jurisdictional requirements should be
amended, requiring perhaps that every case submit first to the
Court's scrutiny in a leave application.
But there are implications more far-reaching than the mere
problem of too many non-meritorious appeals (which, after all, is
really a problem of numbers). Can the Court be said to be fulfilling
its proper function as the nation's ultimate appellate court when it
is so preoccupied (albeit not by choice) with property rights? Is there
a cumulative effect from the many years of performing these required
tasks, which might impair the jurisprudential outlook, rendering it
ill-suited to adjudicate important public law issues? The erratic
behaviour of the Court in recent civil liberties cases would suggest
that the Court is not as well prepared as it might be, to adjudicate
these vital issues. Individual judges seem not to have been affected,
but this is not true of the Court as a whole. Is it then perhaps the
62 See Kilgour, supra, footnote 56, at p. 19.
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short-comings of the judges and not of the system which are reflected
in the decisions? There is no easy answer, but this much seems
clear: the Court is burdened by jurisdictional rules which do not
permit it to confine its energies to meritorious appeals.
APPENDIX A
Thirty-three Acts of Parliament, including the original which
created the Court, have shaped and changed the Supreme Court of
Canada. The following is a list of the Acts together with an indica-
tion of their content:
1875 (Can.) c. 11-the original Act.
1876 (Can.) c. 26--evidence---appeal in bontroverted election
cases.
1877 (Can.) c. 22-witnesses--Carleton County Sheriff ex officio
officer of the Court.
1879 (Can.) c. 39-equity appeals except Quebec-appeals gener-
ally-election cases-Judge's oath-appeal lists-3 sessions
yearly-which judges to deliver judgments.
1880 (Can.) c. 34-amendments during appeal-new trial may
be ordered.
1887 (Can.) c. 16-Separate Exchequer Court.
1888 (Can.) c. 37-quorum-control of library.
1889 (Can.) c. 37-appeals-death of parties-judges not to sit
on certain cases--quorum 4 judges-lists.
1891 (Can.) c. 25-habeas corpus and prohibition-references
by Governor in Council-Court's opinion.
1893 (Can.) c. 29.
1896 (Can.) c. 14-four judges quorum on consent.
1903 (Can.) c. 29-judges' pensions.
c. 69-registrar of Court.
1905 (Can.) c. 47-judges' salaries-restricting judges to judicial
duties.
1906 (Can.) c. 50-federal references.
1908 (Can.) c. 70-appeal lists-order of hearing.
1913 (Can.) c. 51-final judgments defined-admiralty appeals
-annual decisions--affidavit proof of amount in contro-
versy.
1914 (Can.) c. 15-final judgments-costs.
1917 (Can.) c. 23-Crown entitled to costs though solicitor
salaried.
1918 (Can.) c. 7-appointment of ad hoc judges--Quebec appeals
-assessment appeals-courts of final resort.
c. 44-provisions not to apply in pending cases.
1920 (Can.) c. 32-jurisdiction-$2000 requirement-special
leave-definitions.
1922 (Can.) c. 48-appeals from provincial references.
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1925 (Can.) c. 27-appeals-leave by provincial court of last
resort-limiting appeals-procedures-dates of sessions.
1927 (Can.) c. 38-Court expanded to seven judges-compulsory
retirement at 75.
1928 (Can.) c. 9-stated case-sessions of Court-notice of
adjournment.
1929 (Can.) c. 58-opinion of retired judge.
1930 (Can.) c. 44-$2000 limit.
1937 (Can.) c. 42-appeal from Court of final resort.
1949 (Can. 2nd sess.) c. 37-Court expanded to nine judges (3
from Quebec, minimum) -appeals of right, with leave,
special leave, under other Acts, references-abolition of
Privy Council appeals-in forma pauperis-lists and order
of hearing.
1951 (Can.) c. 61-in forma pauperis appeals.
1952 (Can.) c. 12--dates of sessions.
1956 (Can.) c. 48-appeals-registrar and deputy-minimum
limit raised to $10,000-quorum on applications for leave
procedure on appeal-etc. (This Act involved simultaneous
amendment of the Supreme Court Act and the Criminal
Code).
The Supreme Court Act is consolidated in four issues of the
Revised Statutes of Canada:
R.S.C., 1886, c. 135.
R.S.C., 1906, c. 139.
R.S.C., 1927, c. 35.
R.S.C., 1952, c. 259.
1875 (Can.) c. 11, s. 3: The Supreme Court shall be composed
of a Chief Justice and five Puisne Judges, and five of whom, in the
absence of the other of them, may lawfully hold the said Court in
Term.
During the debates in the House of Commons, it was indicated
that six was considered an appropriate number, because at the time
when the Supreme Court of the United States came into being, the
population of the country was about the same as that of Canada in
1875, and they settled on six judges (and increased the number with
time).
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